Japan and Vietnam will begin talks on the possible joint development and production of high-speed landing craft, moving a defence relationship built largely around training and maritime assistance towards direct industrial cooperation.
Japanese Defence Minister Shinjiro Koizumi and Vietnamese Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister Phan Van Giang agreed to open the discussions during talks in Tokyo on 13 July.
Japan’s Ministry of Defense announced the agreement two days later, following an official luncheon between the ministers.
The ministry disclosed no design, manufacturer, timetable or programme value. The wording remains preliminary, with both governments agreeing to explore possible cooperation rather than committing to a specific vessel.
The proposal is nevertheless a significant step. Japan and Vietnam already conduct senior-level exchanges, military visits, port calls and goodwill exercises. Japanese support has also covered capacity building, peacekeeping, cyber security and the acceptance of Vietnamese cadets at Japan’s National Defense Academy.
Joint production would introduce a more permanent industrial component to the relationship.
The ministers also discussed the East and South China seas and reaffirmed the importance of freedom of navigation and overflight, along with compliance with international law and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.
China was not named in the Japanese account of the meeting, although its maritime activity provides much of the strategic context.
Vietnam has competing territorial claims with China in the South China Sea, where Chinese and Vietnamese vessels have repeatedly confronted one another over fishing grounds, energy exploration and disputed features.
Japan faces pressure from China around the Japanese-administered Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea, which Beijing claims as the Diaoyu Islands.
These concerns have drawn Tokyo and Hanoi closer without turning their relationship into an alliance. Vietnam’s “Four No’s” defence policy rules out military alliances, foreign bases, siding with one country against another and the use or threat of force in international relations.
Hanoi has instead built a wide network of defence relationships designed to expand its options while preserving strategic autonomy.
Japan fits that approach particularly well. It is a major economic partner and longstanding provider of development assistance, while remaining outside the rival claimant group in the South China Sea.
Japan has supported Vietnam’s maritime law-enforcement capacity and agreed in 2020 to finance six patrol vessels for the Vietnamese coastguard through a ¥36.6 billion loan.
The two countries elevated their relationship to a comprehensive strategic partnership in 2023. That agreement called for stronger defence exchanges, maritime security cooperation and transfers of defence equipment and technology.
The proposed landing-craft cooperation would provide an early test of whether those commitments can produce jointly developed military hardware.
It also arrives as Vietnam searches for a broader range of weapons suppliers. Hanoi’s armed forces have historically relied heavily on Russian and Soviet-designed equipment, creating difficulties as Russian exports decline and sanctions complicate new purchases.
Vietnam has increased defence contacts with Japan, India, Israel, South Korea and the United States while trying to expand domestic production.
For Tokyo, the talks support a wider effort to turn defence exports and industrial partnerships into instruments of regional security policy. Japan fundamentally revised its defence-transfer framework in April, opening more space for overseas sales and cooperation.
It is now seeking deeper industrial relationships across Southeast Asia, where several governments face Chinese maritime pressure but remain wary of choosing sides between Beijing and Washington.
The landing-craft proposal therefore carries meaning beyond the vessels themselves. It would give Vietnam access to Japanese technology and production expertise, provide Japan with an industrial foothold in a strategically important Southeast Asian state and strengthen practical cooperation between two militaries operating on different sides of China’s maritime approaches.
Koizumi and Giang also agreed to expand bilateral and multilateral cooperation in peacekeeping and cyber security. Giang’s visit was his first to Japan in five years, giving the discussions added weight as both governments seek to turn their 2023 strategic partnership into concrete defence programmes.
The outcome remains uncertain until the two sides identify a design, funding model and division of production. Opening talks on the possible joint development of military vessels still marks a new stage in the relationship.
Japan and Vietnam are creating forms of defence cooperation that stop short of an alliance while making each country better able to withstand pressure at sea.
